Tor market mirrors — verified onion backups
Mirror lists for the seven Tor marketplaces tracked here in 2026. Every operator publishes more than one v3 onion concurrently — sometimes two, usually three — so a single DDoS event doesn’t take the marketplace offline. Sources are PGP-signed mirror announcements posted to Dread; we never trust unsigned forum posts.
Tracked Tor marketplaces — verified URLs
Seven operators currently tracked. Click any name for the full per-market page with the mirror list and key facts.
Nexus Market — three concurrent v3 mirrors. The operator's standard practice is to keep multiple onions warm at once so the marketplace stays reachable under pressure. Current rotation verified against the operator's detached-PGP-signed Dread announcement.
BTC · LTC · XMR
Anubis Market — three concurrent v3 mirrors. Multi-coin operator, English UI. Mirror set updates posted as detached-PGP-signed messages on the operator's Dread account; partial-prefix matching is not a verification, the full 56-character string must match.
BTC · LTC · ETH · XMR
Osiris Market — three concurrent v3 mirrors. The operator runs more endpoints than the average and rotates the 'primary' one as pressure shifts. The full mirror set is published as a PGP-signed Dread post.
BTC · XMR
Crown Market — two concurrent v3 mirrors. Smaller mirror set than most operators here because the bespoke storefront is harder to spin up. Both endpoints published as a PGP-signed Dread post.
BTC · XMR
Mars Market — three concurrent v3 mirrors. The operator's declared policy is endpoint diversity for DDoS resilience. Mars typically stays reachable through pressure that takes shorter-lived markets offline.
BTC · LTC · XMR
Awazon Market — three concurrent v3 mirrors. Updates to the mirror set are posted as PGP-signed Dread messages by the operator. Mainstream-style storefront under the hood — three onions, one back-end.
BTC · XMR
WeTheNorth (WTN) — three concurrent v3 mirrors. All three share the operator's vanity prefix at the start of the address. The full 56-character fingerprint must be verified — partial-prefix matching is a known phishing pattern.
BTC · XMR
The case for tracking mirrors specifically
Many Tor marketplace directories list one URL per marketplace — usually the operator's primary onion at the time of writing. MirrorsMarkets lists every concurrent onion in the operator's current rotation, because the mirror set is the practical answer to most real-world reliability questions. If a marketplace's primary onion is being DDoSed, you don't need another marketplace — you need another mirror of the same marketplace. Tracking the rotation explicitly is what makes that switch a one-second operation rather than a half-hour scramble through unsigned channels.
How operator mirror discipline varies
Not every operator runs the same mirror pool. Mars runs the deepest pool — three onions consistently, sometimes four during DDoS waves. Osiris runs three by policy. Nexus, Anubis, Awazon and WeTheNorth each run three. Crown runs two, which is a deliberate trade-off — the bespoke codebase is harder to spin up across many concurrent onions. The pool size affects how much pressure the marketplace can absorb without going dark; smaller pools mean shorter time between "primary is down" and "marketplace is unreachable."
Why an unsigned mirror is dangerous
The strong-verification source for any mirror is a detached-PGP-signed Dread post by the operator. A mirror surfaced in Telegram, Reddit, email or chat with no signature attached is not authoritative — and phishing clones systematically use those channels because the channels can't reject a fake. The mechanical check is: import the operator's PGP key from their Dread profile once, then verify every signed mirror post against it. A valid signature means the post genuinely came from the operator. An invalid or absent signature means the mirrors in the post are not trustworthy regardless of context.